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Summary:
The March 2004 bombing of passenger trains in Spain highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attack. The number of riders and access points make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo. Nevertheless, steps can be taken to reduce the risks of an attack. The 9/11 Commission called for a systematic analysis of transportation assets, the risks to those assets, and the costs and benefits of different approaches to defending those assets; the Commission also called for homeland security assistance to be distributed based on these assessments of risks and vulnerabilities, rather than according to population. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) does not directly address passenger rail security, but does direct the Department of Homeland Security to create a national strategy for transportation security. This plan would identify national transportation assets, set risk-based priorities for their protection, assign responsibilities for their protection, and recommend appropriate levels and sources of funding for these efforts. P.L. 108-334, the FY2005 appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security, provides $162 million for grants for rail and transit security. The security of passenger rail systems will continue to be an issue during the 109th Congress. A key challenge facing Congress is balancing the desire for and cost of increased rail passenger security with the operating efficiency of the systems, the potential costs that could be incurred in the event of one or more attacks, and with other options for promoting national security. Several proposals made during the 108th Congress would have increased federal funding for passenger rail security to $1 billion a year or more. Opponents of these proposals argue that passenger rail systems are not only inherently vulnerable targets for terrorist attack, but also are only one among many groups of potential targets (e.g., schools, shopping malls, etc). Attempting to defend each of these groups of potential targets would cost billions of dollars, and the security measures may not only be of unproved effectiveness but may also interfere with the way these institutions operate, imposing many indirect costs on society. Rather than spending billions of dollars to provide an uncertain improvement in security for each group of potential targets, some argue that a greater overall level of security can be achieved at less cost by focusing federal security spending on anti-terrorist activities of national defense, intelligence, and lawenforcement organizations, in order to reduce the threats to all homeland activities. This report will be updated as warranted.
