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Summary:
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe has grown into a civil war. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear signs of security progress -- have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. Some senior U.S. military leaders have begun to express less optimism about the security situation in Iraq and they, as well as Bush Administration officials, are expressing some frustration at the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to disband sectarian militias that are committing violence against civilians of rival sects. President Bush indicates that U.S. forces should and will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security, saying that, over the longer term, Iraq can still become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. In several series of speeches since 2005, he asserts that U.S. policy is showing important success, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq's security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has worked to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. Some in Congress believe that major new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by insufficient U.S. troop levels. Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all-out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut popular support for the insurgency. Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted. This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.
