Download Locations:
Summary:
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, "Strategy for Victory," the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear signs of security progress -- have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. President Bush, after a visit to Baghdad on June 13, 2006, has asserted that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq's security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. However, other Administration officials, including senior military leaders, have begun to express less optimism about the situation in Iraq. Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is failing and that major new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop levels. Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut popular support for the insurgency. Others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counterinsurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted. This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.
