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Summary:
Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing U.S. objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing his regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has been more difficult than anticipated. The desired outcome would likely prevent Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report (Chapter 12, Section 2). During the 1990s, U.S. efforts to change Iraq's regime failed because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the vigilance of Iraq's overlapping security services. President George W. Bush characterized Iraq as a grave and gathering threat because of its refusal to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and its potential to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. After a November 2002-March 2003 round of U.N. WMD inspections in which Iraq's cooperation was mixed, on March 19, 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm and change Iraq's regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003.
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and reduction of support for terrorism — Iraq's conversion from dictatorship to democracy, it was argued, might catalyze the promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East. However, escalating resistance to the U.S.-led occupation has complicated U.S. efforts to establish legitimate and effective Iraqi political and security bodies and establish democracy. Partly in an effort to satisfy Iraqi demands for an end to coalition occupation, the United States accelerated the hand over of sovereignty. An interim government was named on June 1, 2004, and the handover took place on June 28, 2004. Elections were held on January 30, 2005 for a transitional National Assembly, and major parties are negotiating to form a new government. Plans are for votes on a permanent constitution by October 31, 2005, and for a permanent government by December 15, 2005.
Although acknowledging that the insurgency is adversely affecting U.S. policy, the Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq will ultimately succeed because the Iraqi people essentially rebuked the insurgents by voting in large numbers. The Administration also asserts progress in building Iraq's various security forces, assisted by U.S., NATO, and other international trainers. While virtually all observers are hopeful that the elections will produce a positive turnaround, some believe that Sunni Arabs, who largely boycotted the vote, have been further marginalized and that the insurgency remains at pre-election levels.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Post-Saddam National Elections, CRS Report RS22079, the Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq; CRS Report RL32783, FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance.
