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Summary:
Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing that regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has run into substantial difficulty. Past U.S. efforts to change the regime failed because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq's several overlapping security services. Previous U.S. Administrations had ruled out major U.S. military action to change Iraq's regime, believing such action would be risky and not necessarily justified by the level of Iraq's lack of compliance on WMD disarmament. In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to verifiably abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In September 2002, the President told the U.N. General Assembly that unless Iraq fully disarmed in cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States would lead a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily, making clear that this would include the ouster of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein's regime. After a November 2002 - March 2003 round of U.N. inspections in which Iraq's cooperation was mixed, on March 19, 2003 the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq and change its regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003. In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and reduction of support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the Middle East. However, escalating resistance to the U.S.-led occupation has contributed to Administration implementation of several options, including attempts to recruit more foreign participation to post-war peacekeeping, building Iraqi institutions that can maintain security, and, as of November 2003, accelerating transfer of authority to Iraqi political bodies. Formerly exiled opposition groups form the core of a U.S.-appointed 25-seat "governing council" as well as a 25-person cabinet; these bodies are relatively representative of Iraq's ethnic and political factions, but they have not established themselves as effective institutions. Congress has passed legislation (H.R. 3289, P.L. 108-106) that provides supplemental FY2004 funding for military costs and reconstruction in Iraq (and Afghanistan). See also CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, and CRS Report RL32090, FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & Reconstruction Assistance. This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.
